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Abstract: 
 
From a public interest perspective, there could be a justification for constraining market 
mechanisms with the aim of progressive redistribution. However, some policies might be 
based on selfish motivations of government agents. In this paper, we empirically contrast 
if the infrastructure policy is based only on public interest motivations or if it is also based 
on the private motivations of policy makers. In this way, Spain infrastructure policy 
provides a useful policymaking field to test hypothesis about the behavior of policy 
makers. We find some evidence regarding the strength of political motivations in 
explaining such behavior. In fact, results from our analysis show that political motivations 
can eventually play a more relevant role than social welfare maximization.    
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Abstract: 
 
From a public interest perspective, there could be a justification for constraining market 
mechanisms with the aim of progressive redistribution. However, some policies might be 
based on selfish motivations of government agents. In this paper, we empirically contrast 
if the infrastructure policy is based only on public interest motivations or if it is also based 
on the private motivations of policy makers. In this way, Spain infrastructure policy 
provides a useful policymaking field to test hypothesis about the behavior of policy 
makers. We find some evidence regarding the strength of political motivations in 
explaining such behavior. In fact, results from our analysis show that political motivations 
can eventually play a more relevant role than social welfare maximization.    
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1. Introduction 
Traditionally, airports have been seen as monopolistic infrastructures that hold tight 
control over flights with origins and destinations in their hinterlands. Consequently, 
neither economic analysis nor infrastructure policy used to consider competition as one of 
the relevant features of airports. Nowadays there exists a clear trend towards 
corporatization of airports. Like privatization, corporatization has been seen as a way to 
reform airports whose ownership and management have remained public. Within this 
context, competition has been seen as a powerful tool to stimulate efficiency.  
Competition among airports at the international level is now a standard feature in all 
developed countries. Moreover, within each country airports compete to grow and win an 
increasing part of the business. Spain, alone among developed countries with more than 
one large airport, defies this pattern. Despite having a large population and several large 
airports, Spain air travel remains organized as a totally integrated network: airports are 
exclusively owned and managed by the central government. Thus, competition among 
airports does not exist. The market has no role in issues such as pricing or resource 
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2
allocation. The most relevant features of airport management are decided on bureaucratic 
basis and approved within the Spanish Government budgetary process. 
Why is the Spanish system such an exception? No matter the political affiliation of the 
ruling party, politicians in charge and bureaucrats have regularly claimed that inter-
territorial solidarity is the main rationale for their choice. Their story goes as follows: less 
developed areas in Spain must have airports for regional development. However, such 
areas cannot sustain airports costs. In this way, it is said that centralized management and 
allocation of funds would allow the surplus from the largest and most profitable airports 
to pay for the deficits incurred by the smallest and least profitable airports. In short, rich 
airports would be paying for keeping poor airports working. Is this what is actually 
happening? 
As far as social welfare maximization is concerned, there could be a potential 
justification for constraining market mechanisms with the aim of progressive 
redistribution.1 This brings us to a traditional conundrum of public policy; the trade-off 
between efficiency and equity. However, if we accept that the behavior of public agents is 
aimed to their own interest, some policies designed to prevent competition might actually 
be based on selfish motivations, while justified on the grounds of progressive 
redistribution.  
Through our analysis we will empirically contrast two competing explanations for the 
persistence of the unusual model in Spain. On the one hand, there does exist the public 
interest explanation. From the point of view of the ‘general interest’, market mechanisms 
would generate a less than socially desirable level of airport operating facilities, and public 
intervention is needed to correct this ‘market failure’. This would be consistent with the 
standard explanation by politicians and bureaucrats we have summarized above. However, 
1 One could ask whether alternative systems of grants and subsidies could work better to make up the 
deficits of the non-profitable airports. In every other country, no matter its system of management and 
funding, these kinds of tools are used so that unprofitable airports can operate. We do not go with detail into 
this, since this departs from the central questions in our paper. 
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3
our results show that choices of governments have been motivated by neither a 
progressive redistribution criterion nor the claim of supporting smaller airports.  
On the other hand, we explore a public choice approach. Within that framework, the 
agents of governments are rational utility maximizers: politicians trying to maximize 
success in elections, while officials seek to maximize their own budget. As long as each 
group pursues its own-interests they will tend to resist institutional arrangements that 
might constrain their behavior and enhance opportunities for efficient performance. 
Within our specific framework, introducing market mechanisms in the provision of public 
services would limit increases in the discretionary budgets in the control of officials 
(Niskanen, 1971). Our results provide evidence that governments distribute investment in 
airports so that they can increase their electoral support. 
The idea of this work is related with the recent literature on regional allocation of 
public investments. Some recent works in this literature focus the attention on the 
traditional trade-off between equity and efficiency in public policies (Yamano and 
Ohkawara, 2000; de la Fuente, 2005). Our paper is more closely related to the literature 
that analyzes not just the efficiency-equity issue but also the role of political factors in 
explaining the regional allocation of public investment in infrastructure.2 Kemmerling and 
Stephan (2002) show that, along with the equity objective, political support from citizens 
for the incumbent party in the central government is crucial in explaining the distribution 
of investment grants across cities. Castells and Solé (2005) find that political considerations 
promote differences in the attractiveness of regions to the central government in such a 
way that a deviation from the efficiency-equity rule can arise.  
Certainly, the efficiency-equity trade-off relationship in infrastructure policies is a basic 
and relevant story. But it is not the sole story to be found in the regional allocation of 
2 Another similar strand of literature but less related to our work is that focused on the political motivations 
with regard to grant allocations between different government levels. Empirical applications of this issue can 
be found, for example, in Worthington and Dollery (1998), Case (2001), Costa et al. (2003) and Johansson 
(2003).   
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4
public investments in infrastructure. This paper adds to the literature by analyzing a 
scenario where infrastructure policy may pursue neither efficiency nor equity.  
Indeed, airport management in Spain is embodied with specific features that allow us 
to test a hypothesis about the behavior of government agents. Since one of the main 
consequences of integrated airport management is that decisions about investment are 
centralized in the national government, we want to disentangle the following questions: Is 
the allocation of investments in Spanish airports effectively based on redistributive 
purposes? Which factors explain actual allocations? Is airport policy in Spain consistent 
with publicly announced objectives?  
To advance our research we organize the paper as follows. First, we briefly review the 
main features of the Spanish system of airport management and finance and analyze it 
within the framework of international models. Then we proceed with our empirical 
analysis. Initially, we focus on economic factors, and subsequently, political factors. 
Finally, we summarize our main results and draw out their main implications. 
2. Airport management in Spain: the exception to the rule  
High quality airport facilities foster intercity agglomeration economies and influence 
the location decision of firms, especially those in knowledge intensive sectors (Button et 
al., 1999; Brueckner, 2003). Hence, the link between the quality of airport facilities and 
urban economic growth could provide a rationale for guaranteeing airport facilities in less 
developed regions. In a similar way, scale economies could provide a motivation to 
support small airports. Indeed, high fixed costs associated with airport operations may 
help explaining the existence of a positive relationship (although no necessarily a linear 
one) between air traffic and airport profitability –and so the amount of self-finance 
available for investments (European Commission, 2002). Thus, airports that generate a 
low volume of traffic may not be profitable  
Managing airports as an integrated national network arises as a, though by no means 
the only, possible strategy of regional policy. In fact, as shown in table 1, European 
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5
airports that belong to large national airport networks are usually managed on an 
autonomous basis. This is the case for Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom 
(and other large Anglo-Saxon countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia). 
Autonomy is also the case for the Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, Belgium and Austria. 
Indeed, in all these countries grants and subsidies to small airports and/or airports located 
in poor regions are often available from more than one government level. 
Where a national network is run in a centralized way, it has just one large airport. Such 
a situation exists in Sweden, Portugal, Finland and most of the new accession countries. 
Spanish is unique, because it is the only European country with several large cities and 
airports in which all airports are managed by a single national agency.  
Insert table 1 about here 
 Indeed, the Spanish Airports and Air Navigation Agency (AENA) owns and manages 
more than 40 commercial airports in Spain. AENA is a public entity belonging to the 
Ministry in charge of transportation issues, and it enjoys an autonomous legal and 
economic status. Investment decisions are centralized and are financed through the 
surplus of the entire airport system.3 In this way, there is a system of non-transparent, 
cross-subsidization across Spanish airports. Importantly, politicians have justified 
centralized management on the grounds that it supports territorial cohesion. The 
possibility of competition between airports or the benefits of a differentiated commercial 
policy is not recognized. 
Where airports are managed on market criteria, the amount of investment in each 
airport should be strongly associated with the revenues obtained from local operations. 
Such revenues are fundamentally determined by the amount of traffic at the airport. On 
the contrary, when a territorial cohesion criterion is in place less developed regions should 
3. Investment decisions are taken as follows: The Budget proposed by the Spanish Government to the 
Parliament displays in an annex the investments that AENA intends to implement during the fiscal year. The 
Spanish Parliament can either approve or reject this proposal, which cannot be modified. It is worth 
mentioning that there is no allocation of funds from the budget, since all AENA investment is financed with 
aeronautical fees and commercial revenues. 
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receive more resources for investment than their share of traffic would justify. 
Furthermore, scale economies should justify an investment allocation outcome in which 
large (profitable) airports cross-subsidize small (unprofitable) airports.     
Some facts about the investment behavior of AENA cast doubts about political claims 
concerning the integrated airport network as a guarantee of the territorial cohesion 
criterion.  
The first year of activity of AENA was 1992 (in the previous period, the Ministry in 
charge of transportation issues was the unique responsible of airport management). Table 
2 shows the relationship between investment and passenger traffic for the Spanish airport 
network in period 1992-2004, and the corresponding relative position of each region in 
terms of economic development. We present the results aggregated on a regional basis 
because the regional level is the one for which most of the variables needed for further 
analysis are available (individual information for each airport is available upon request). 
Column (3) shows the relationship for every Spanish region between share of total 
investment and share of total passengers.  
Insert table 2 about here 
In the period 1992-2004, the richest Spanish region with the largest airport, Madrid, 
accumulated about 60 per cent of total investment but only 22 per cent of total traffic. The 
ratio (investment share)/(traffic share) is certainly high: 2.60. Overall, airports in the less 
developed Spanish regions (Extremadura, Andalusia, Galicia, Murcia and Asturias) 
received a share of investment lower than their share of air traffic generated. Thus, the 
allocation of airport investments in Spain does not seem to follow the territorial cohesion 
criterion regularly used by politicians to justify centralized management. Furthermore, 
several lightly populated regions with low levels of air traffic have an investment/traffic 
ratio smaller than one. In short, we must go look further to determine whether airport 
investments decisions have been effectively aimed to other objectives.    
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7
3. Empirical analysis: Determinants of the regional allocation of airport 
investments  
In order to obtain an equation that explains the allocation of airport investments 
across regions, we consider that policy makers of the central government maximize an 
objective function. Such objective function could be aimed to social purposes and/or 
political interests since both aspects could affect the utility of those agents.  
To this regard, we follow the approach of Bernham and Craig (1987). The objective 
function of the central government is defined over infrastructure outcomes in region i (i 
=1,.....I) from a given country at period t (t = 1,….T) and can be expressed through the 
following form: 
 Wt = i Oit  , (1) 
where Oit is a vector of infrastructure outcomes. This expression implies that the 
central government maximizes infrastructure outcomes. The first derivative with respect to 
Oit is assumed to be positive (QWt/QOit> 0).  
The central government’s maximization problem is subject to two constraints. First, 
there is a resource constraint. This implies that total investments can not be higher than 
the total resources available for that purpose:  
 i INVit  Rt , (2) 
where Rt are total resources available at period t, which are assumed to be fixed and 
constant across regions, and INVit are airport investments across regions.  
The second constraint specifies that infrastructure outcomes across regions depend on 
investments made on them weighted by a vector of regional characteristics at period t, Zit .
Additionally, each element of the vector of regional characteristics is weighted by a 
parameter, Z, such that unequal concern of the central government about different 
regions can arise:  
 Oit= Cit(ZZit)h(INVit), (3) 
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8
First order conditions of the central government’s maximization problem yield  
h’(INVit) Cit(ZZi) = m, for all i                                               (4) 
Here, m is the multiplier associated to the resource constraint, which necessarily binds. 
This provides us with a general specification of the investment equation that is going to be 
tested in our empirical analysis:   
 INVit/Rt = g[Cit(ZZit)]                                                     (5) 
Our empirical model will consider g as a linear function, which could be justified as a 
first order Taylor approximation:  
 INVit/Rt = i ZZit , (6) 
where Zit = GDP it , PAX it , NAC it , INCUM it , CORREit (See definitions below).  
Given the value of Rt , Z > 0 implies that QINVit /QZit > 0, while Z’ < 0 implies that 
QINVit /QZ’it < 0. In this context, we must consider the elements of the vector of regional 
characteristics.  
Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP) and air traffic (PAX) are included in this 
vector. Indeed, where territorial cohesion criteria influence the airport investment 
decisions of the central government, regions with low product per capita should receive 
more investment than regions with high product per capita. Furthermore, where airport 
investments are aimed to support small airports those investments in a region should 
increase less than proportionally to the traffic generated for the airports of that region.  
In addition to this, the central government could try to maximize the surpluses of 
domestic rather than international passengers, since the latter are not incorporated in its 
objective function. Thus, the proportion of national traffic with respect to the total traffic 
(NAC) should be included in the vector of regional characteristics.   
Finally, the political clout of each region, due to the popularity of the central 
government’s incumbent party in the corresponding region (INCUM) or due to the 
correspondence between the incumbent party in the central and regional governments 
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9
(CORRE), may play a central role in the allocation choice of public resources of the central 
government as we will see below. Hence equation (6) can be expressed as follows:  
INVit/Rt = µ + GDPGDP + PAXPAX + NACNAC + INCUMINCUM + CORRE CORRE  (7) 
From our analysis the following hypotheses can be established, which we test in 
further sections: 
Hypothesis I: Consistently with claims of progressive redistribution, regions with low 
product per capita should receive more investment than regions with high product per 
capita. According to this hypothesis, GDP  in equation (7) should take a value lower than 0. 
Hypothesis II: If investments are aimed to support small airports, those investments 
in a region should increase less than proportionally to the traffic generated for the airports 
of that region.  According to this hypothesis, PAX   in equation (7) should take a value 
lower than 1.  
Hypothesis III: Government looks after cross-subsidies from international 
passengers to national travelers. Consistently with this, investments should be higher in 
regions with higher ratios domestic traffic/total traffic. According to this hypothesis, NAC   
in equation (7) should take a value greater than 0. 
Hypothesis IV: Investment allocations are used to enhance political support. 
Consistently with this, investments should be higher in regions where the ruling party has 
strong electoral support and/or the regional government is held by the same party holding 
national government. According to this hypothesis, INCUM  and CORRE   in equation (7) 
should take a value greater than 0. 
Hypothesis I, II are consistent with an objective funcion of policymakers of the central 
government that fits a social welfare function, while hypothesis IV is consistent with a 
welfare funcion of policymakers that fits with a political rent-seeking behaviour. 
Hypothesis III is consistent with an objective funcion of policymakers that fits both with a 
social welfare function and a political rent-seeking behaviour.  
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3.1 Economic factors 
It is of central interest in our empirical analysis to examine any type of cross-
subsidization that can take place between the regional networks of the Spanish airport 
system. Hence equation (6) can be expressed for the empirical analysis in the following 
way:  
 INVit = µ + GDPGDPit + PAXPAX it + NACNACit + it, (8) 
where INVit refers to the percentage of investment made in airports from region i with 
respect to the total investment in the national airport network. GDPit refers to Gross 
Domestic Product per capita, PAXit refers to the percentage of annual passengers carried 
in the airports from region i with respect to the total annual traffic in the national airport 
network and NACit refers to the percentage of national passengers carried in the airports 
from region i with respect to the total annual traffic in the regional airport network. The 
error term ( it) is assumed to be independent and identically distributed over regions and 
time, with mean 0 and variance 2. However, we test (and correct if pertinent) these 
assumptions in the empirical analysis.   
In order to estimate this model, we have constructed a panel data for the period 1992-
2004 for the 15 Spanish regions with airports. This period captures the first year of activity 
of the current airport management system and it is long enough to smooth out distortions 
from single projects in a particular period. To this regard, as figure 1 shows, the huge 
amount of investments made in the last six years in comparison to the previous years 
allows claiming that initial conditions should not play a relevant role.  
Insert figure 1 about here 
Data on the territorial allocation of investment have been obtained from the Ministry 
of Transport; data for Gross Domestic Product per capita have been obtained from the 
Spanish Statistics Institute. Finally, data of airport traffic have been obtained from AENA. 
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Table A-1 in Appendix shows the description and summary statistics of the variables used 
for estimating our investment equation.4
Table 3 shows the results of our estimates of the investment equation, while table 4 
indicates the elasticities than can be inferred from them. Column 1 presents the results of 
the estimates when using the Feasible Generalized Least Squares estimator (FGLS). The 
tests about the validity of the error term assumptions indicate the existence of 
heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation. A problem of serial autocorrelation does 
not seem to take place. Column 2 displays the results of the estimates when using the 
FGLS estimator with the error term corrected for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional 
correlation. In this setting, Betz and Katz (1995) show that FGLS estimator involves an 
underestimation of standard errors. In column 3, we present the results of the estimates 
when using the Ordinary Least Squares Estimator with Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSE). This latter estimator corrects both for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional 
correlation in the error-term and for underestimation of standard errors.  
As could be expected, the three estimators provide similar values of the estimated 
coefficients but different standard errors. Correction for heteroskedasticity and cross-
sectional correlation using the FGLS estimator reduces the standard errors (see columns 1 
and 2 of table 3). The estimation with the PCSE estimator is more efficient than that using 
FGLS without correcting for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation (see 
columns 1 and 3 of table 3) but tends to increase the standard errors obtained with the 
FGLS estimator with robust standard errors (see columns 2 and 3 of table 3). In any case, 
4. There is a possible simultaneity bias for the GDP variable as long as airport investment can be a 
determinant of economic growth. However, our units of measurement are flows rather than stocks so that 
annual investments in airports have a very low weight on the total stock of infrastructure, which must be one 
of the main determinants of economic growth. In addition, it is worth taking into account that airport effects 
on economic growth are particularly strong at a microeconomic level (greater market access, travel time 
reductions, attraction of high-tech firms and so on). Additionally, we argue that the PAX variable should not 
be endogenous either. Indeed, air traffic in a year can be dependent on airport capacity as a stock but not on 
the contemporaneous annual investments in the airport, which influences only partially that stock for the 
following years. 
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statistical significance of all explanatory variables is not affected for the calculation of the 
standard errors.   
Insert table 3 about here 
Insert table 4 about here 
 
All variables are significant and the overall explanatory power of the equation estimated 
is reasonably high, regardless of the econometric technique used. Our results show clear 
evidence that progressive redistribution is not relevant to the airport investment choice of 
the central government. Indeed, the percentage of total investments in a region seems to 
increase when product per capita of that region also increases, which is not consistent with 
hypothesis I above.  
In addition to this, we do not find evidence that airport investments are motivated by a 
scale economies argument (in order to support regions with the smallest airports) because 
the percentage of total investments increases more than proportionally to the output 
generated for each regional airport network. Indeed, a 10 per cent increase in the share of 
the total traffic of the airport network implies about a 13 per cent increase in the share of 
the total investments made in the airport network. Holding the other factors constant, the 
percentage of total investments is higher in regional airport networks with a higher 
proportion of national traffic. These results are consistent with our hypothesis III above 
but not with our hypothesis II.  
Table A-2 in Appendix provides additional evidence of the results obtained in our 
estimates of the investment equation. In this way, table A-2 presents airport financial data 
for the last two years in which this information is available, 1997 and 1998.5 From the data, 
it can be observed that cross-subsidization across Spanish airports does not take place 
from high-profitability to low-profitability regional networks, as expected if scale 
economies were controlled. Actually, the most profitable airport has the highest traffic-
5. Since the late nineties AENA and the Spanish Government have been extremely reluctant to provide 
financial information on individual airports. Indeed, one of the consequences of an integrated management 
is that it makes possible for governments to be less transparent and, thus, less subject to democratic control. 
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investment ratio, while many of the non-profitable airports have traffic-investment rates 
lower than one. In fact, data from this table, along with the results of the investment 
equation estimates, allows us to infer a type of redistribution not mentioned by Spanish 
airport authorities. All profitable regional networks with low investment-traffic ratios 
(Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, Andalusia and C. Valenciana) have a common feature. 
They all have, at least, one large airport focused on tourist traffic. This fact seems to 
confirm that cross-subsidization from international to domestic passengers is taken place 
in the Spanish airport system.  
3.2. Political factors 
Since neither progressive redistribution nor scale economies seem to be the real 
objective of the centralization of the Spanish airport network, further analysis is needed to 
understand the objectives of Spanish airport authorities. Several studies (Cadot et al., 1999; 
Kemmerling and Stephan, 2002; Castells and Solé, 2005) show that political motivations 
based on the self-interest of the public decision-makers can play a crucial role in the 
allocation of the stock of infrastructure across regions.  
Where election systems are based on proportional rules, as is the case in Spain, 
politicians are motivated to maximize the number of votes their party obtains in highly 
populated electoral districts.6 Following Grossman (1994), the incumbent party in the 
central government may allocate public resources in order to buy the support of voters 
and political agents across regions. Ceteris paribus, more resources will be invested in 
those regions that have the most - and most valuable - political capital to offer. Such 
political capital will be greater where the support for the incumbent party in the central 
government is also greater, and it will be even more valuable where a correspondence 
exists between the incumbent party in the central government and the incumbent party in 
the regional government.   
6 Where election systems are based on majority rule, as it happens in the USA and UK, for instance, 
politicians try to maximize the probability of winning seats in a unipersonal electoral district.   
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Alternatively, some studies argue that the central government could invest more in the 
regions where the closeness in elections between the two main parties is higher (Dalhberg 
and Johansson, 2002; Johansson, 2003). Under this hypothesis, the incumbent party tries 
to obtain higher rates of returns –in terms of votes- from its investments.  
In order to capture these political factors, we add to equation (8) the following political 
variables:    
 INCUM: Percentage of votes in the last general elections for the incumbent party in the 
central government in the corresponding regions of the sample. 
 SWING: The difference in the percentage of votes between the two main parties in the 
general elections across regions.   
 CORRE: Dummy variable that takes value 1 when there is a correspondence between the 
incumbent party in the central government and the incumbent party in the regional 
government.  
Data for the political variables have been obtained from the web site of the Ministry of 
Domestic Affairs (Ministerio del Interior). It is expected a positive sign in the coefficient 
of variables INCUM and CORRE, as especified in our hypothesis IV above, while it is 
expected a negative sign in the coefficient of the variable SWING.
The political variables are estimated separately in order to avoid multicollineality. 
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of our estimates of equation (8) with the addition of the 
political variables. In columns 1 and 2, we show the results when the political variables 
added are INCUM and SWING, respectively. In column 3, we show results when the 
political variable added is CORRE. Regarding the econometric techniques used, we follow 
the same procedure to section 3.1. As in the previous estimation without political 
variables, the tests about the validity of the error term assumptions indicate the existence 
of heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation but not a problem of serial 
autocorrelation. In order to clarify the exposition, we just present the results when using 
the Ordinary Least Squares Estimator with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE). As in 
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the previous estimation without political variables, the values of the coefficients and its 
statistical significance are similar to those obtained when using the Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares Estimator (FGLS). 
Insert table 5 about here 
Insert table 6 about here 
Results for the economic variables do not change substantially in relation to those 
obtained in the specification without political variables. The variable capturing the 
influence of partisan support, INCUM, is statistically and economically significant. Thus, 
we find some evidence that partisan support could play an important role in the 
investment allocation choices of the central government. Indeed, the incumbent party in 
the central government seems to compensate regions for partisan support in order to 
assure votes.   
Results for the variable that captures the difference in the percentage of votes between 
the two main parties in the general elections across regions, SWING, show that such effect 
is, in our context, not relevant. We believe this is not surprising in our analysis, since swing 
voters are of paramount importance within the framework of one-seat elections systems, 
where one vote gives the majority. This is not the case in Spain, where jurisdictions are 
multi-seat and seats are assigned by means of a proportional system (with d’Hont 
correction). Because of this, maximization of absolute number of votes fits better than 
marginal changes due to swing voters.  
The coefficient of the dummy variable capturing the correspondence between the 
incumbent party in the central government and the incumbent party in the regional 
government, CORRE, is also economically and statistically significant. Thus, political 
affiliation seems to favor better coordination between decision-makers at different 
territorial levels of government.  
Overall, our results suggest that politics mater in the allocation of airport investments 
across regions. Divergence between the policy announced and the policy effectively 
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implemented could be explained, at least to some extent, by a desire to maximize the 
contribution of that policy to the re-election chances of the incumbent party.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
The Spanish model of airport management and finance is singular among comparable 
developed countries. Spain is unique among countries with several large cities and 
important airports in that its system is strictly centralized and publicly owned. This peculiar 
institutional setting prevents competition among Spanish airports, and policy makers and 
bureaucrats in charge of the system rhetorically justify it on grounds of inter-territorial 
solidarity.  
Through our empirical analysis of the determinants of airport investments in Spain 
across regions, we find that the choices of the central government have been motivated by 
neither a progressive redistribution criterion nor the demands of supporting smaller 
airports. Indeed, ceteris paribus high-income regions receive relatively more public 
resources than low-income regions. In addition to this, we find evidence that investment 
increases more than proportionally to the output generated by the regional airport 
networks, while our data shows that cross-subsidization from high-profitability airports to 
low-profitability regional networks does not seem to take place. On the contrary, we find 
that cross-subsidization arises from international to domestic passengers.  
Given that economic factors do not explain the allocation of investments across 
regions, we pay attention to the influence of political motivations. We find some evidence 
that the incumbent party in the central government could try to maximize support from 
regional citizens. Indeed, more public resources seem to be invested in those regions 
where the support for the party in central government is greater. In addition to this, more 
public resources are invested in those regions where the incumbent party in the central 
government and the incumbent party in the regional government are the same.  
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Rich and big airports do not pay to keep poor and small airports working. According 
to our results, solidarity seems to be merely a rhetorical excuse to prevent competition 
among Spanish airports. In fact, competition would constrain discretionary power of 
policy makers and bureaucrats over management and budgets. We are aware that the 
public choice paradigm for explaining policymaking is too simple and naïve, and policy 
processes are much more complex than can be explained by the self-interested policy 
maker alone. Nevertheless, when analyzing why the system of airport management and 
finance in Spain is different from any other comparable country, we do not find much 
more than rhetoric about solidarity to prevent competition in order to maximize power 
and budget. 
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Appendix  
 
Table A-1. Description of the variables and summary statistics (Number of 
observations: 195) 
Variable Description Mean Standard 
deviation
Minimum 
value 
Maximum 
value 
INV 
 
INV
GDP 
 
PAX 
 
PAX
NAC 
 
INCUM 
 
SWING 
 
CORRE 
 
Total investment in airports of the region 
(103 euros) 
The share of investment of each region over 
total investment 
Gross Domestic Product per capita in each 
region (euros) 
Total output (number of annual passengers 
carried in airports of the region) 
The share of output of each region over 
total traffic 
Percentage of national passengers over total 
traffic in airports of each region 
Percentage of votes in the general elections 
for the incumbent party in each region 
 
The difference in the percentage of votes 
between the two main parties in the general 
elections across regions 
 
Correspondence between  incumbent party 
in the central and regional government in 
each region 
 
54,181.31
0.07 
 
13,368 
 
8,001,865
0.07 
 
0.66 
 
0.41 
 
0.08 
 
0.52 
 
184,457.3 
 
0.130 
 
4,054 
 
1.05e+07 
 
0.08 
 
0.27 
 
0.10 
 
0.12 
 
0.50 
 
10.22 
 
0
6,408 
 
15,547 
 
0
0.08 
 
0.18 
 
-0.21 
 
0
1,552,165 
 
0.707 
 
23,889 
 
3.81e+07 
 
0.26 
 
1
0.58 
 
0.32 
 
1
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Table A-2. Spanish airports operating profits. Millions of euros 
Region Operating 
results 
(Yearly average 
1997-98) 
Share of the total 
surplus generated 
by regions with 
surplus  
Share of the 
net surplus 
of the 
network 
Ratio 
Investment-
traffic 
Madrid (1) 89.7 39.3% 45.7% 2.60 
Canary Islands (8) 
 
40.7 
 
17.8% 
 
20.8% 
 
0.41 
Catalonia (3) 40.2 17.6% 20.5% 0.99 
Balears Islands (3) 41.8 18.3% 21.3% 0.35 
Valencian C. (2) 10.8 4.7% 5.5% 0.35 
Andalusia (6) 5.1 2.2% 2.6% 0.39 
Surplus in system  228.3 100.0%   
Extremadura (1) -0.6  -0.3% 0.54 
Castile & Leon (3) -1.8  -0.9% 1.82 
Murcia (1) -2.0  -1.0% 0.80 
Navarra (1) -2.1  -1,1% 0.69 
Asturias (1) -2.6  -1.3% 0.98 
Cantabria (1) -2.8  -1.4% 1.04 
Aragon (1) -2.9  -1.5% 1.82 
Galicia (1) -6.9  -3.5% 0.70 
Basque C.(1) -7.6  -3.9% 1.18 
Losses in system -32.2  
Network surplus 196.1  100.0%  
Note: 1998 is the last year for which financial data on operating results for individual airports has been 
made available by AENA. See footnote 11 above. 
Source: Own elaboration on AENA information (published in Bel, 2002 and RvyT, 1999). 
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Tables and figures 
 
Figure 1. Total investments in the Spanish airport network, 1985-2004. 
Mean annual values over the period (milions of euros 2004) 
300.74
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Source: Own elaboration on information obtained from Ministerio de Fomento. Data in the 
period 1985-1993 is available at the web page of IVIE-FBBVA, while data in the period 1994-
2004 is available at the web page of Ministerio de Fomento.  
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Table 1. Major airports and air traffic of passengers in EU-25 countries.  
 Source: Eurostat 
 
Country Number of 
Top 50  EU 
airports. 2002 
Total 
passengers 
(103). 2003 
National 
passengers 
(103).2003 
International 
passengers 
(103).2003 
Airport  
management 
 
Airport  
Ownership 
United 
Kingdom 
8 177,946 24,416 153,530 Decentralized private, regional 
gov. 
Germany 8 121,136 21,193 99,943 Decentralized private, regional 
gov. and national 
gov. 
Spain 9 120,248 31,324 88,925 Centralized national 
government  
France 6 96,296 26,712 69,584 Decentralized national gov. 
(Paris), chambers of 
commerce (rest)  
Italy 6 73,912 24,477 49,436 Decentralized private, regional 
gov.  
Netherlands 1 41,168 154 41,014 Decentralized private, national 
gov. 
Greece 1 28,237 5,030 23,207 Partially 
Decentralized 
private (Athens), 
national gov. (rest) 
Sweden 1 20,441 6,875 13,567 Centralized national 
government 
Ireland 1 20,010 812 19,197 Decentralized national 
government 
Denmark 1 19,575 1,606 17,969 Decentralized private, national 
gov. 
Portugal 2 17,739 2,853 14,886 Centralized national 
government 
Austria 1 15,799 548 15,251 Decentralized private, national 
gov. 
Belgium 1 15,087 2 15,085 Decentralized private, regional 
gov. 
Finland 1 10,516 2,701 7,816 Centralized national 
government 
Czech 
Republic 
1 7,761 161 7,600 Centralized national 
government 
Poland - 7,067 Na Na Centralized national 
government 
Cyprus 1 6,077 1 6,076 Centralized national 
government 
Hungary 1 5,010 0 5,010 Centralized national 
government 
Malta - 2,648 44 2,604 Centralized national 
government 
Luxembourg - 1,449 0 1,449 Centralized national 
government 
Slovenia - 920 Na Na Decentralized private, national 
gov. 
Lithuania - 722 1 721 Centralized national 
government 
Latvia - 712 0 712 Centralized national 
government 
Estonia - 710 15 695 Centralized national 
government 
Slovakia - 626 32 594 Centralized national 
government 
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Table 2. Spanish airport and regional data, 1992-2004. Mean annual values over the period  
Region* (1) 
Share of total 
investment 
(Spain = 817,114 
103 constant euros) 
(2) 
Share of total 
traffic (Spain 
= 120,291,150 
passengers) 
(3) 
Ratio 
Investment-
traffic (1/2) 
(4) 
Share of total 
population (Spain 
= 38,617,092 
inhabitants) 
(5) 
Share of total GDP 
(Spain = 557,063,815 
103 constant euros) 
(6) 
Relative 
wealth index 
(5/4) 
Madrid (1) 57.81% 22.36% 2.60 13.61% 17.72% 1.30 
Catalonia (3) 14.60% 14.78% 0.99 16.31% 19.54% 1.20 
Canary islands (8)  9.06% 22.31% 0.41 4.38% 4.12% 0.94 
Balears islands (3) 6.62% 18.98% 0.35 2.14% 2.56% 1.20 
Andalusia (6) 3.79% 9.81% 0.39 18.97% 14.10% 0.74 
Basque C. (3) 2.44% 2.07% 1.18 5.46% 6.61% 1.21 
Valencian C. (2) 2.15% 6.08% 0.35 10.69% 10.12% 0.95 
Galicia (3) 1.33% 1.90% 0.70 7.13% 5.69% 0.80 
Asturias (1) 0.54% 0.55% 0.98 2.82% 2.42% 0.86 
Castille & Leon (3) 0.38% 0.21% 1.82 6.51% 6.05% 0.93 
Aragon (1) 0.36% 0.20% 1.82 3.11% 3.34% 1.07 
Cantabria (1) 0.20% 0.19% 1.04 1.39% 1.33% 0.95 
Navarra (1) 0.15% 0.22% 0.69 1.41% 1.76% 1.25 
Murcia  (1) 0.15% 0.19% 0.80 2.51% 2.97% 0.85 
Extremadura (1) 0.01% 0.03% 0.54 2.79% 1.84% 0.66 
* In parenthesis, we indicate the number of airports of the region that provide commercial traffic. 
Source: Own elaboration on information obtained from the web page of the Ministerio de Fomento (Spanish ministry of transports), the 
Spanish statistics Institut (INE) and the web page of  IVIE-FBBVA.   
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Table 3. Investment equation estimates. N = 195 
1 Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.  
2 OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and contemporaneous 
correlation).  
3 Standard errors in parenthesis  
4 Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
5 Wald1 = Wald Test (2) of joint significance; BP = Breusch-Pagan LM test of cross-sectional correlation;  
Wald2 = Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity; Dp= Bhargava et al. test for serial autocorrelation 
(modified Durbin-Watson test)                                       
Table 4. Estimated elasticities (evaluated at sample means) 
Dependent variable: INV
FGLS (1) FGLS1 (2) PCSE2 (3) 
GDP  
 
PAX
NAC 
0.80 (0.32)** 
 
1.35 (0.16)*** 
 
1.31 (0.33)*** 
0.79 (0.01)*** 
 
1.34 (0.02)*** 
 
1.29 (0.03)*** 
0.80 (0.19)** 
 
1.35 (0.09)*** 
 
1.31 (0.20)*** 
1 Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.  
2 OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation).  
3 Standard errors in parenthesis  
4 Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
 
Dependent variable: INV
FGLS (1) FGLS1 (2) PCSE2 (3) 
GDP   
 
PAX
NAC 
 
Intercept 
3.96e-06 (1.56e-06)** 
 
1.349 (0.10)*** 
 
0.130 (0.03)*** 
 
-0.163 (0.03)*** 
3.93e-06 (4.03e-08)*** 
 
1.342 (0.01)*** 
 
0.128 (0.002)*** 
 
-0.161 (0.003)*** 
3.96e-06 (8.58e-07)*** 
 
1.349 (0.06)*** 
 
0.130 (0.01)*** 
 
-0.163 (0.02)*** 
Wald1  
R2
BP 
Wald2 
Dp
257.77*** 
-
453.986*** 
1.15e+05*** 
1.18 
69,350.32*** 
-
-
-
-
1,373.81*** 
0.57 
-
-
-
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Table 5. Investment equation estimates. N = 195 
1 OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation). 
2 Standard errors in parenthesis  
3 Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
 
Table 6. Estimated elasticities (evaluated at sample means) 
Dependent variable: INV
PCSE1 (1) PCSE1 (2) PCSE1 (3) 
GDP  
 
PAX
NAC 
 
INCUM 
 
SWING 
 
CORRE 
0.74 (0.21)*** 
 
1.40 (0.13)*** 
 
1.44 (0.23)*** 
 
0.82 (0.34)** 
 
-
-
0.77 (0.18)*** 
 
1.36 (0.10)*** 
 
1.33 (0.20)*** 
 
-
0.02 (0.05) 
 
-
0.74 (0.15)*** 
 
1.44 (0.12)*** 
 
1.51 (0.19)*** 
 
-
-
0.46 (0.13)*** 
1 OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation). 
2 Standard errors in parenthesis  
3 Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
 
Dependent variable: INV
PCSE1 (1) PCSE1 (2) PCSE1 (3) 
GDP   
 
PAX
NAC 
 
INCUM 
 
SWING 
 
CORRE 
 
Intercept 
3.65e-06 (9.44e-07)*** 
 
1.40 (0.08)*** 
 
0.14 (0.01)*** 
 
0.13 (0.05)** 
 
-
-
-0.22 (0.04)*** 
3.81e-06 (8.37e-07)*** 
 
1.36 (0.07)*** 
 
0.13 (0.02)*** 
 
-
0.0002 (0.0004) 
 
-
-0.16 (0.02)*** 
3.66e-06 (7.54e-07)** 
 
1.44 (0.08)*** 
 
0.15 (0.01)*** 
 
-
-
0.06 (0.01)*** 
 
-0.21 (0.03)*** 
Wald 
R2
1,231.96*** 
0.58 
1,291.71*** 
0.57 
1,373.81*** 
0.62 
Page 28 of 56
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Preventing competition because of “solidarity”:  
Rhetoric and reality of airport investments in Spain 
 
Germà Bel (Universitat de Barcelona)  
& Xavier Fageda (Universitat de Barcelona) 
 
Corresponding author: Germà Bel, Universitat de Barcelona. Postal address: Department 
of Economic Policy (School of Economics), Avd. Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona, Spain.  
E-mail:gbel@ub.edu 
Xavier Fageda, Universitat de Barcelona. Postal address: Department of Economic Policy 
(School of Economics), Avd. Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona, Spain.   
E-mail: xfageda@ub.edu 
Abstract: 
 
From a public interest perspective, there could be a justification for constraining market 
mechanisms with the aim of progressive redistribution. However, some policies might be 
based on selfish motivations of government agents. In this paper, we empirically contrast 
if the infrastructure policy is based only on public interest motivations or if it is also based 
on the private motivations of policy makers. In this way, Spain infrastructure policy 
provides a useful policymaking field to test hypothesis about the behavior of policy 
makers. We find some evidence regarding the strength of political motivations in 
explaining such behavior. In fact, results from our analysis show that political motivations 
can eventually play a more relevant role than social welfare maximization.    
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Preventing competition because of ‘solidarity’: 
Rhetoric and reality of airport investments in Spain 
 
Abstract: 
 
From a public interest perspective, there could be a justification for constraining market 
mechanisms with the aim of progressive redistribution. However, some policies might be 
based on selfish motivations of government agents. In this paper, we empirically contrast 
if the infrastructure policy is based only on public interest motivations or if it is also based 
on the private motivations of policy makers. In this way, Spain infrastructure policy 
provides a useful policymaking field to test hypothesis about the behavior of policy 
makers. We find some evidence regarding the strength of political motivations in 
explaining such behavior. In fact, results from our analysis show that political motivations 
can eventually play a more relevant role than social welfare maximization.    
 
Key words:  Public Enterprise, Legal monopolies, Air Transportation, Models with 
Panel Data 
Jel Codes: L32, L43, L93, C23:  
 
1. Introduction 
Traditionally, airports have been seen as monopolistic infrastructures that hold tight 
control over flights with origins and destinations in their hinterlands. Consequently, 
neither economic analysis nor infrastructure policy used to consider competition as one of 
the relevant features of airports. Nowadays there exists a clear trend towards 
corporatization of airports. Like privatization, corporatization has been seen as a way to 
reform airports whose ownership and management have remained public. Within this 
context, competition has been seen as a powerful tool to stimulate efficiency.  
Competition among airports at the international level is now a standard feature in all 
developed countries. Moreover, within each country airports compete to grow and win an 
increasing part of the business. Spain, alone among developed countries with more than 
one large airport, defies this pattern. Despite having a large population and several large 
airports, Spain air travel remains organized as a totally integrated network: airports are 
exclusively owned and managed by a State Owned Enterprise, ‘AENA’. Thus, competition 
among airports does not exist. The market has no role in issues such as pricing or resource 
allocation. Some of the more relevant features of airport management, such as investment 
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decisions or prices policy, are decided on bureaucratic basis and approved by the Spanish 
Parliament together with the National Budget.1
Why is the Spanish system such an exception? No matter the political affiliation of the 
ruling party, politicians in charge and bureaucrats have regularly claimed that inter-
territorial solidarity is the main rationale for their choice. Their story goes as follows: less 
developed areas in Spain must have airports for regional development. However, such 
areas cannot sustain airports costs. In this way, it is said that centralized management and 
allocation of funds would allow the surplus from the largest and most profitable airports 
to pay for the deficits incurred by the smallest and least profitable airports. In short, rich 
airports would be paying for keeping poor airports working. Is this what is actually 
happening? 
As far as social welfare maximization is concerned, there could be a potential 
justification for constraining market mechanisms with the aim of progressive 
redistribution.2 This brings us to a traditional conundrum of public policy; the trade-off 
between efficiency and equity. However, if we accept that the behavior of public agents is 
aimed to their own interest, some policies designed to prevent competition might actually 
be based on selfish motivations, while justified on the grounds of progressive 
redistribution.  
Through our analysis we will empirically contrast two competing explanations for the 
persistence of the unusual model in Spain. On the one hand, there does exist the public 
interest explanation. From the point of view of the ‘general interest’, market mechanisms 
would generate a less than socially desirable level of airport operating facilities, and public 
intervention is needed to correct this ‘market failure’. This would be consistent with the 
 
1 Another relevant feature of airport management, slots’ assignment to airlines, is decided by a commission 
made of ‘AENA’ top managers and direct representatives of the Ministry of Transport (Ministerio de 
Fomento).   
2 One could ask whether alternative systems of grants and subsidies could work better to make up the 
deficits of the non-profitable airports. In every other country, no matter its system of management and 
funding, these kinds of tools are used so that unprofitable airports can operate. We do not go with detail into 
this, since this departs from the central questions in our paper. 
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standard explanation by politicians and bureaucrats we have summarized above. However, 
our results show that choices of governments have been motivated by neither a 
progressive redistribution criterion nor the claim of supporting smaller airports.  
On the other hand, we explore a public choice approach. Within that framework, the 
agents of governments are rational utility maximizers: politicians trying to maximize 
success in elections while bureaucrats, in this case ‘AENA’ top managers, seek to 
maximize their own budget. As long as each group pursues its own-interests they will tend 
to resist institutional arrangements that might constrain their behavior and enhance 
opportunities for efficient performance. Within our specific framework, introducing 
market mechanisms in the provision of public services would limit increases in the 
discretionary budgets in the control of bureaucrats (Niskanen, 1971). Our results provide 
evidence that governments distribute investment in airports so that they can increase their 
electoral support. 
The idea of this work is related with the recent literature on regional allocation of 
public investments. Some recent works in this literature focus the attention on the 
traditional trade-off between equity and efficiency in public policies (Yamano and 
Ohkawara, 2000; de la Fuente, 2005). Our paper is more closely related to the literature 
that analyzes not just the efficiency-equity issue but also the role of political factors in 
explaining the regional allocation of public investment in infrastructure.3 Kemmerling and 
Stephan (2002) show that, along with the equity objective, political support from citizens 
for the incumbent party in the central government is crucial in explaining the distribution 
of investment grants across cities. Castells and Solé (2005) find that political considerations 
promote differences in the attractiveness of regions to the central government in such a 
way that a deviation from the efficiency-equity rule can arise.  
 
3 Another similar strand of literature but less related to our work is that focused on the political motivations 
with regard to grant allocations between different government levels. Empirical applications of this issue can 
be found, for example, in Worthington and Dollery (1998), Case (2001), Costa et al. (2003) and Johansson 
(2003).   
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4
Certainly, the efficiency-equity trade-off relationship in infrastructure policies is a basic 
and relevant story. But it is not the sole story to be found in the regional allocation of 
public investments in infrastructure. This paper adds to the literature by analyzing a 
scenario where infrastructure policy may pursue neither efficiency nor equity.  
Indeed, airport management in Spain is embodied with specific features that allow us 
to test a hypothesis about the behavior of government agents. Since one of the main 
consequences of integrated airport management is that decisions about investment are 
centralized in the national government, we want to disentangle the following questions: Is 
the allocation of investments in Spanish airports effectively based on redistributive 
purposes? Which factors explain actual allocations? Is airport policy in Spain consistent 
with publicly announced objectives?  
To advance our research we organize the paper as follows. First, we briefly review the 
main features of the Spanish system of airport management and finance and analyze it 
within the framework of international models. Then we proceed with our empirical 
analysis. Initially, we focus on economic factors, and subsequently, political factors. 
Finally, we summarize our main results and draw out their main implications. 
2. Airport management in Spain: the exception to the rule  
High quality airport facilities foster intercity agglomeration economies and influence 
the location decision of firms, especially those in knowledge intensive sectors (Button et 
al., 1999; Brueckner, 2003).4 Hence, the link between the quality of airport facilities and 
urban economic growth could provide a rationale for guaranteeing airport facilities in less 
developed regions. In a similar way, scale economies could provide a motivation to 
support small airports. Indeed, high fixed costs associated with airport operations may 
help explaining the existence of a positive relationship (although no necessarily a linear 
 
4 In a more general context, a great number of studies have analyzed the impact of public capital stock on 
private sector productivity [e.g. Aschauer’s (1989), Duffy-Deno and Ebberts (1991), Garcia-Milà and 
McGuire (1992), Holtz-Eakin (1994), Flores de Frutos et al. (1998), Miller and Tsoukis (2001), Milbourne et 
al. (2003)]. In general terms, such impact is considered to be relevant although there is no agreement on the 
precise elasticities estimated. 
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5
one) between air traffic and airport profitability –and so the amount of self-finance 
available for investments (European Commission, 2002). Thus, airports that generate a 
low volume of traffic may not be profitable  
Managing airports as an integrated national network arises as a, though by no means 
the only, possible strategy of regional policy. In fact, as shown in table 1, European 
airports that belong to large national airport networks are usually managed on individual 
basis. This is the case for Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom (and other large 
Anglo-Saxon countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia). Autonomy is also the case 
for the Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, Belgium and Austria. Indeed, in all these countries 
grants and subsidies to small airports and/or airports located in poor regions are often 
available from more than one government level. 
Where a national network is run in a centralized way, it has just one large airport. Such 
a situation exists in Sweden, Portugal, Finland and most of the new accession countries. 
Spanish is unique, because it is the only European country with several large cities and 
airports in which all airports are managed by a single national agency.  
Insert table 1 about here 
 Indeed, the Spanish Airports and Air Navigation Agency (AENA) owns and manages 
more than 40 commercial airports in Spain. AENA is a public entity belonging to the 
Ministry in charge of transportation issues, and it enjoys an autonomous legal and 
economic status. Investment decisions are centralized and are financed through the 
surplus of the entire airport system.5 In this way, there is a system of non-transparent, 
cross-subsidization across Spanish airports. Importantly, politicians have justified 
centralized management on the grounds that it supports territorial cohesion. The 
 
5 Investment decisions are taken as follows: The Budget proposed by the Spanish Government to the 
Parliament displays in an annex the investments that AENA intends to implement during the fiscal year. The 
Spanish Parliament can either approve or reject this proposal, which cannot be modified. It is worth 
mentioning that there is no allocation of funds from the budget, since all AENA investment is financed with 
aeronautical fees and commercial revenues. 
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6
possibility of competition between airports or the benefits of a differentiated commercial 
policy is not recognized. 
Where airports are managed on market criteria, the amount of investment in each 
airport should be strongly associated with the revenues obtained from local operations. 
Such revenues are fundamentally determined by the amount of traffic at the airport. On 
the contrary, when a territorial cohesion criterion is in place less developed regions should 
receive more resources for investment than their share of traffic would justify. 
Furthermore, scale economies should justify an investment allocation outcome in which 
large (profitable) airports cross-subsidize small (unprofitable) airports.     
Some facts about the investment behavior of AENA cast doubts about political claims 
concerning the integrated airport network as a guarantee of the territorial cohesion 
criterion.  
The first year of activity of AENA was 1992 (in the previous period, the Ministry in 
charge of transportation issues was the unique responsible of airport management). Table 
2 shows the relationship between investment and passenger traffic for the Spanish airport 
network in period 1992-2004, and the corresponding relative position of each region in 
terms of economic development. We present the results aggregated on a regional basis 
because the regional level is the one for which most of the variables needed for further 
analysis are available (individual information for each airport is available upon request). 
Column (3) shows the relationship for every Spanish region between share of total 
investment and share of total passengers.  
Insert table 2 about here 
In the period 1992-2004, the richest Spanish region with the largest airport, Madrid, 
accumulated almost 60 per cent of total investment but only 22 per cent of total traffic. 
The ratio (investment share)/(traffic share) is certainly high: 2.60. Overall, airports in the 
less developed Spanish regions (Extremadura, Andalusia, Galicia, Murcia and Asturias) 
received a share of investment lower than their share of air traffic generated. Thus, the 
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7
allocation of airport investments in Spain does not seem to follow the territorial cohesion 
criterion regularly used by politicians to justify centralized management. Furthermore, 
several lightly populated regions with low levels of air traffic have an investment/traffic 
ratio smaller than one. In short, we must go look further to determine whether airport 
investments decisions have been effectively aimed to other objectives.    
 
3. Empirical analysis: Determinants of the regional allocation of airport 
investments  
In order to obtain an equation that explains the allocation of airport investments 
across regions, we consider that policy makers of the central government maximize an 
objective function. Such objective function could be aimed to social purposes and/or 
political interests since both aspects could affect the utility of those agents.  
To this regard, we follow the approach of Bernham and Craig (1987). The objective 
function of the central government is defined over infrastructure outcomes in region i (i 
=1,.....I) from a given country at period t (t = 1,….T) and can be expressed through the 
following form: 
 Wt = i Oit  , (1) 
where Oit is a vector of infrastructure outcomes.6 This expression implies that the 
central government maximizes infrastructure outcomes. The first derivative with respect to 
Oit is assumed to be positive (QWt/QOit> 0).  
The central government’s maximization problem is subject to a resource constraint. 
This implies that total investments can not be higher than the total resources available for 
that purpose:  
 i INVit  Rt , (2) 
where Rt are total resources available at period t and INVit are airport investments 
across regions.  
 
6 For simplicity, henceforth the vector of infrastructure outcomes is defined as a variable.  
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Infrastructure outcomes across regions depend on investments made on them, as well 
as on specific factors such as the intensity of use. Additionally, infrastructure outcomes 
will also depend on the objectives of the central government since it is needed to consider 
not only the aggregate effect of infrastructure policies but also its impact on different 
regions, for example on regions with different income levels.  
In this way, the allocation of investments in infrastructures across regions should 
depend on a vector of regional characteristics at period t, Zit. Additionally, each element of 
the vector of regional characteristics may be weighted by a parameter, Z, such that 
unequal concern of the central government about different variables (Z), which values may 
be different –or not- from one region to another, can arise.  
Hence we can derive a general specification of the investment equation that is going to 
be tested in our empirical analysis:   
INVit/Rt = i ZZit ,                                                (3) 
where Zit = GDP it , PAX it , NAC it , INCUM it , CORREit (See definitions below).  
Given the value of Rt , Z > 0 implies that QINVit /QZit > 0, while Z’ < 0 implies that 
QINVit /QZ’it < 0. In this context, we must consider the elements of the vector of regional 
characteristics.  
Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP) and air traffic (PAX), which in the 
empirical analysis refers to the percentage of passengers carried in the airports from a 
region with respect to the total traffic in the national network, are included in this vector. 
Indeed, where territorial cohesion criteria influence the airport investment decisions of the 
central government, regions with low product per capita should receive more investment 
than regions with high product per capita. Furthermore, where airport investments are 
aimed to support small airports those investments in a region should increase less than 
proportionally to the traffic generated for the airports of that region.  
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In addition to this, the central government could try to maximize the surpluses of 
domestic rather than international passengers, since the latter are not incorporated in its 
objective function. Thus, the proportion of national traffic with respect to the total traffic 
(NAC) should be included in the vector of regional characteristics.   
Finally, the political clout of each region, due to the popularity of the central 
government’s incumbent party in the corresponding region (INCUM) or due to the 
correspondence between the incumbent party in the central and regional governments 
(CORRE), may play a central role in the allocation choice of public resources of the central 
government as we will see below. It is worth noting that in the empirical analysis INCUM 
refers to the percentage of votes in the last general elections for the incumbent party in the 
central government in the corresponding regions of the sample, while CORRE is a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 when there is a correspondence between the incumbent party in 
the central government and the incumbent party in the regional government.  
Hence equation (3) can be expressed as follows: 
INVit/Rt = µ + GDPGDP + PAXPAX + NACNAC + INCUMINCUM + CORRECORRE   
+it, (4) 
where it is a random error term. From our analysis the following hypotheses can be 
established, which we test in further sections: 
Hypothesis I: Consistently with claims of progressive redistribution, regions with low 
product per capita should receive more investment than regions with high product per 
capita. According to this hypothesis, GDP  in equation (4) should take a value lower than 0. 
Hypothesis II: If investments are aimed to support small airports, those investments 
in a region should increase less than proportionally to the traffic generated for the airports 
of that region.  According to this hypothesis, PAX  in equation (4) should take a value lower 
than 1.  
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Hypothesis III: Government looks after cross-subsidies from international 
passengers to national travelers. Consistently with this, investments should be higher in 
regions with higher ratios domestic traffic/total traffic. According to this hypothesis, NAC   
in equation (4) should take a value greater than 0. 
Hypothesis IV: Investment allocations are used to enhance political support. 
Consistently with this, investments should be higher in regions where the ruling party has 
strong electoral support and/or the regional government is held by the same party holding 
national government. According to this hypothesis, INCUM  and CORRE   in equation (4) 
should take a value greater than 0. 
Hypothesis I, II are consistent with an objective function of policymakers of the 
central government that fits a social welfare function, while hypothesis IV is consistent 
with a welfare function of policymakers that fits with a political rent-seeking behaviour. 
Hypothesis III is consistent with an objective function of policymakers that fits both with 
a social welfare function and a political rent-seeking behaviour.  
3.1 Economic factors 
It is of central interest in our empirical analysis to examine any type of cross-
subsidization that can take place between the regional networks of the Spanish airport 
system. Hence equation (3) can be expressed for the empirical analysis in the following 
way:  
 INVit/Rt = µ + GDPGDPit + PAXPAX it + NACNACit + it, (5) 
where INVit/Rt refers to the percentage of investment made in airports from region i
with respect to the total investment in the national airport network. The explanatory 
variables are defined as follows:   
1. GDPit: Gross Domestic Product per capita of region i.
2. PAXit: Percentage of annual passengers carried in the airports from region i with 
respect to the total annual traffic in the national airport network.  
Page 39 of 56
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
11
3. NACit: Percentage of national passengers carried in the airports from region i with 
respect to the total annual traffic in the regional airport network.  
The error term ( it) is assumed to be independent and identically distributed over 
regions and time, with mean 0 and variance 2. However, we test (and correct if pertinent) 
these assumptions in the empirical analysis.   
In order to estimate this model, we have constructed a panel data for the period 1992-
2004 for the 15 Spanish regions with airports. This period captures the first year of activity 
of the current airport management system and it is long enough to smooth out distortions 
from single projects in a particular period. To this regard, as figure 1 shows, the huge 
amount of investments made in the last six years in comparison to the previous years 
allows claiming that initial conditions should not play a relevant role.7
Insert figure 1 about here 
Data on the territorial allocation of investment have been obtained from the Ministry 
of Transport; data for Gross Domestic Product per capita have been obtained from the 
Spanish Statistics Institute. Finally, data of airport traffic have been obtained from AENA. 
Table A-1 in Appendix shows the description and summary statistics of the variables used 
for estimating our investment equation.8
Table 3 shows the results of our estimates of the investment equation, while table 4 
indicates the elasticities than can be inferred from them. Column 1 presents the results of 
the estimates when using the Feasible Generalized Least Squares estimator (FGLS). The 
 
7 The allocation of investments across regions in period 1985-2004 is similar to that obtained in period 1992-
2004.  Data for traffic is not available before 1992 so that the empirical analysis is restricted to period 1992-
2004.  
8 There is a possible simultaneity bias for the GDP variable as long as airport investment can be a 
determinant of economic growth. However, our units of measurement are flows rather than stocks so that 
annual investments in airports have a very low weight on the total stock of infrastructure, which must be one 
of the main determinants of economic growth. In addition, it is worth taking into account that airport effects 
on economic growth are particularly strong at a microeconomic level (greater market access, travel time 
reductions, attraction of high-tech firms and so on). Additionally, we argue that the PAX variable should not 
be endogenous either. Indeed, air traffic in a year can be dependent on airport capacity as a stock but not on 
the contemporaneous annual investments in the airport, which influences only partially that stock for the 
following years. 
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tests about the validity of the error term assumptions indicate the existence of 
heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation. A problem of serial autocorrelation does 
not seem to take place. Column 2 displays the results of the estimates when using the 
FGLS estimator with the error term corrected for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional 
correlation. In this setting, Betz and Katz (1995) show that FGLS estimator involves an 
underestimation of standard errors. In column 3, we present the results of the estimates 
when using the Ordinary Least Squares Estimator with Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSE). This latter estimator corrects both for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional 
correlation in the error-term and for underestimation of standard errors.  
As could be expected, the three estimators provide similar values of the estimated 
coefficients but different standard errors. Correction for heteroskedasticity and cross-
sectional correlation using the FGLS estimator reduces the standard errors (see columns 1 
and 2 of table 3). The estimation with the PCSE estimator is more efficient than that using 
FGLS without correcting for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation (see 
columns 1 and 3 of table 3) but tends to increase the standard errors obtained with the 
FGLS estimator with robust standard errors (see columns 2 and 3 of table 3). In any case, 
statistical significance of all explanatory variables is not affected for the calculation of the 
standard errors.   
Insert table 3 about here 
Insert table 4 about here 
 
All variables are significant and the overall explanatory power of the equation estimated 
is reasonably high, regardless of the econometric technique used. Our results show clear 
evidence that progressive redistribution is not relevant to the airport investment choice of 
the central government. Indeed, the percentage of total investments in a region seems to 
increase when product per capita of that region also increases, which is not consistent with 
hypothesis I above.  
Page 41 of 56
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
13
In addition to this, we do not find evidence that airport investments are motivated by a 
scale economies argument (in order to support regions with the smallest airports) because 
the percentage of total investments increases more than proportionally to the output 
generated for each regional airport network. Indeed, 10 percentage points increase in the 
share of the total traffic of the airport network implies about 13 percentage points increase 
in the share of the total investments made in the airport network. Holding the other 
factors constant, the percentage of total investments is higher in regional airport networks 
with a higher proportion of national traffic. These results are consistent with our 
hypothesis III above but not with our hypothesis II.  
Table A-2 in Appendix provides additional evidence of the results obtained in our 
estimates of the investment equation. In this way, table A-2 presents airport financial data 
for the last two years in which this information is available, 1997 and 1998.9 From the data, 
it can be observed that cross-subsidization across Spanish airports does not take place 
from high-profitability to low-profitability regional networks, as expected if scale 
economies were controlled. Actually, the most profitable airport has the highest traffic-
investment ratio, while many of the non-profitable airports have traffic-investment rates 
lower than one. In fact, data from this table, along with the results of the investment 
equation estimates, allows us to infer a type of redistribution not mentioned by Spanish 
airport authorities. All profitable regional networks with low investment-traffic ratios 
(Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, Andalusia and C. Valenciana) have a common feature. 
They all have, at least, one large airport focused on tourist traffic. This fact seems to 
confirm that cross-subsidization from international to domestic passengers is taken place 
in the Spanish airport system.  
 
9 Since the late nineties AENA and the Spanish Government have been extremely reluctant to provide 
financial information on individual airports. Indeed, one of the consequences of an integrated management 
is that it makes possible for governments to be less transparent and, thus, less subject to democratic control. 
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3.2. Political factors 
Since neither progressive redistribution nor scale economies seem to be the real 
objective of the centralization of the Spanish airport network, further analysis is needed to 
understand the objectives of Spanish airport authorities. Several studies (Cadot et al., 1999; 
Kemmerling and Stephan, 2002; Castells and Solé, 2005) show that political motivations 
based on the self-interest of the public decision-makers can play a crucial role in the 
allocation of the stock of infrastructure across regions.  
Where election systems are based on proportional rules, as is the case in Spain, 
politicians are motivated to maximize the number of votes their party obtains in highly 
populated electoral districts.10 Following Grossman (1994), the incumbent party in the 
central government may allocate public resources in order to buy the support of voters 
and political agents across regions. Ceteris paribus, more resources will be invested in 
those regions that have the most - and most valuable - political capital to offer. Such 
political capital will be greater where the support for the incumbent party in the central 
government is also greater, and it will be even more valuable where a correspondence 
exists between the incumbent party in the central government and the incumbent party in 
the regional government.   
Alternatively, some studies argue that the central government could invest more in the 
regions where the closeness in elections between the two main parties is higher (Dalhberg 
and Johansson, 2002; Johansson, 2003). Under this hypothesis, the incumbent party tries 
to obtain higher rates of returns –in terms of votes- from its investments.  
In order to capture these political factors, we add to equation (5) the following political 
variables:    
 1. INCUM: Percentage of votes in the last general elections for the incumbent party in 
the central government in the corresponding regions of the sample. 
 
10 Where election systems are based on majority rule, as it happens in the USA and UK, for instance, 
politicians try to maximize the probability of winning seats in a unipersonal electoral district.   
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2. SWING: The difference in the percentage of votes between the two main parties in 
the general elections across regions.   
 3. CORRE: Dummy variable that takes value 1 when there is a correspondence between 
the incumbent party in the central government and the incumbent party in the regional 
government.  
Data for the political variables have been obtained from the web site of the Ministry of 
Domestic Affairs (Ministerio del Interior). It is expected a positive sign in the coefficient 
of variables INCUM and CORRE, as specified in our hypothesis IV above, while it is 
expected a negative sign in the coefficient of the variable SWING.
The political variables are estimated separately in order to avoid multicollineality. 
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of our estimates of equation (5) with the addition of the 
political variables. In columns 1 and 2, we show the results when the political variables 
added are INCUM and SWING, respectively. In column 3, we show results when the 
political variable added is CORRE. Regarding the econometric techniques used, we follow 
the same procedure to section 3.1. As in the previous estimation without political 
variables, the tests about the validity of the error term assumptions indicate the existence 
of heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation but not a problem of serial 
autocorrelation. In order to clarify the exposition, we just present the results when using 
the Ordinary Least Squares Estimator with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE). As in 
the previous estimation without political variables, the values of the coefficients and its 
statistical significance are similar to those obtained when using the Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares Estimator (FGLS). 
Insert table 5 about here 
Insert table 6 about here 
Results for the economic variables do not change substantially in relation to those 
obtained in the specification without political variables. The variable capturing the 
influence of partisan support, INCUM, is statistically and economically significant. Indeed, 
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10 percentage points increase in the percentage of votes of the incumbent party in a region 
implies about 8 percentage points increase in the share of the total investments made in 
the airport network. Thus, we find some evidence that partisan support could play an 
important role in the investment allocation choices of the central government. Indeed, the 
incumbent party in the central government seems to compensate regions for partisan 
support in order to assure votes.   
Results for the variable that captures the difference in the percentage of votes between 
the two main parties in the general elections across regions, SWING, show that such effect 
is, in our context, not relevant. We believe this is not surprising in our analysis, since swing 
voters are of paramount importance within the framework of one-seat elections systems, 
where one vote gives the majority. This is not the case in Spain, where jurisdictions are 
multi-seat and seats are assigned by means of a proportional system (with d’Hont 
correction). Because of this, maximization of absolute number of votes fits better than 
marginal changes due to swing voters.  
The coefficient of the dummy variable capturing the correspondence between the 
incumbent party in the central government and the incumbent party in the regional 
government, CORRE, is also economically and statistically significant. Indeed, such 
correspondence implies almost 4 percentage points increase in the share of the total 
investments made in the airport network. Thus, political affiliation seems to favor better 
coordination between decision-makers at different territorial levels of government.  
Overall, our results suggest that politics mater in the allocation of airport investments 
across regions. Divergence between the policy announced and the policy effectively 
implemented could be explained, at least to some extent, by a desire to maximize the 
contribution of that policy to the re-election chances of the incumbent party.  
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4. Concluding remarks 
The Spanish model of airport management and finance is singular among comparable 
developed countries. Spain is unique among countries with several large cities and 
important airports in that its system is strictly centralized and publicly owned. This peculiar 
institutional setting prevents competition among Spanish airports, and policy makers and 
bureaucrats in charge of the system rhetorically justify it on grounds of inter-territorial 
solidarity.  
Through our empirical analysis of the determinants of airport investments in Spain 
across regions, we find that the choices of the central government have been motivated by 
neither a progressive redistribution criterion nor the demands of supporting smaller 
airports. Indeed, ceteris paribus high-income regions receive relatively more public 
resources than low-income regions. In addition to this, we find evidence that investment 
increases more than proportionally to the output generated by the regional airport 
networks, while our data shows that cross-subsidization from high-profitability airports to 
low-profitability regional networks does not seem to take place. On the contrary, we find 
that cross-subsidization arises from international to domestic passengers.  
Given that economic factors do not explain the allocation of investments across 
regions, we pay attention to the influence of political motivations. We find some evidence 
that the incumbent party in the central government could try to maximize support from 
regional citizens. Indeed, more public resources seem to be invested in those regions 
where the support for the party in central government is greater. In addition to this, more 
public resources are invested in those regions where the incumbent party in the central 
government and the incumbent party in the regional government are the same.  
Rich and big airports do not pay to keep poor and small airports working. According 
to our results, solidarity seems to be merely a rhetorical excuse to prevent competition 
among Spanish airports. In fact, competition would constrain discretionary power of 
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policy makers and bureaucrats over management and budgets. We are aware that the 
public choice paradigm for explaining policymaking is too simple and naïve, and policy 
processes are much more complex than can be explained by the self-interested policy 
maker alone. Nevertheless, when analyzing why the system of airport management and 
finance in Spain is different from any other comparable country, we do not find much 
more than rhetoric about solidarity to prevent competition in order to maximize power 
and budget. 
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APPENDIX 
 
(Insert Table A-1) 
 
(Insert Table A-2) 
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Tables and figures 
 
Figure 1. Total investments in the Spanish airport network, 1985-2004. 
Mean annual values over the period (milions of euros 2004) 
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Source: Own elaboration on information obtained from Ministerio de Fomento. Data in the 
period 1985-1993 is available at the web page of IVIE-FBBVA, while data in the period 1994-
2004 is available at the web page of Ministerio de Fomento.  
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Table 1. Major airports and air traffic of passengers in EU-25 countries.  
 Source: Eurostat, European Commission (2002, 2006) and airports web pages. 
 
Country Number of 
Top 50  EU 
airports. 2002 
Total 
passengers 
(103). 2003 
National 
passengers 
(103).2003 
International 
passengers 
(103).2003 
Airport  
management 
 
Airport  
Ownership 
United 
Kingdom 
8 177,946 24,416 153,530 Individual private, regional 
gov. 
Germany 8 121,136 21,193 99,943 Individual private, regional 
gov. and national 
gov. 
Spain 9 120,248 31,324 88,925 Centralized national 
government  
France 6 96,296 26,712 69,584 Individual national gov. 
(Paris), chambers of 
commerce (rest)  
Italy 6 73,912 24,477 49,436 Individual private, regional 
gov.  
Netherlands 1 41,168 154 41,014 Individual private, national 
government 
Greece 1 28,237 5,030 23,207 Individual private (Athens), 
national go. (others)
Sweden 1 20,441 6,875 13,567 Centralized national 
government 
Ireland 1 20,010 812 19,197 Individual national 
government 
Denmark 1 19,575 1,606 17,969 Individual private, national 
government 
Portugal 2 17,739 2,853 14,886 Centralized national 
government 
Austria 1 15,799 548 15,251 Individual private, national 
gov. 
Belgium 1 15,087 2 15,085 Individual private, regional 
gov. 
Finland 1 10,516 2,701 7,816 Centralized national 
government 
Czech 
Republic 
1 7,761 161 7,600 Individual national gov. 
(Prague) / regional 
gov. (others) 
Poland - 7,067 Na Na Centralized national 
government 
Cyprus 1 6,077 1 6,076 Centralized national 
government 
Hungary 1 5,010 0 5,010 Individual private 
Malta - 2,648 44 2,604 Individual private 
Luxembourg - 1,449 0 1,449 Centralized national 
government 
Slovenia - 920 Na Na Individual private, national 
gov. 
Lithuania - 722 1 721 Centralized national 
government 
Latvia - 712 0 712 Centralized national 
government 
Estonia - 710 15 695 Centralized national 
government 
Slovakia - 626 32 594 Centralized national 
government 
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Table 2. Spanish airport and regional data, 1992-2004. Mean annual values over the period  
Region* (1) 
Share of total 
investment 
(Spain = 817,114 
103 constant euros) 
(2) 
Share of total 
traffic (Spain 
= 120,291,150 
passengers) 
(3) 
Ratio 
Investment-
traffic (1/2) 
(4) 
Share of total 
population (Spain 
= 38,617,092 
inhabitants) 
(5) 
Share of total GDP 
(Spain = 557,063,815 
103 constant euros) 
(6) 
Relative 
wealth index 
(5/4) 
Madrid (1) 57.81% 22.36% 2.60 13.61% 17.72% 1.30 
Catalonia (3) 14.60% 14.78% 0.99 16.31% 19.54% 1.20 
Canary islands (8)  9.06% 22.31% 0.41 4.38% 4.12% 0.94 
Balears islands (3) 6.62% 18.98% 0.35 2.14% 2.56% 1.20 
Andalusia (6) 3.79% 9.81% 0.39 18.97% 14.10% 0.74 
Basque C. (3) 2.44% 2.07% 1.18 5.46% 6.61% 1.21 
Valencian C. (2) 2.15% 6.08% 0.35 10.69% 10.12% 0.95 
Galicia (3) 1.33% 1.90% 0.70 7.13% 5.69% 0.80 
Asturias (1) 0.54% 0.55% 0.98 2.82% 2.42% 0.86 
Castille & Leon (3) 0.38% 0.21% 1.82 6.51% 6.05% 0.93 
Aragon (1) 0.36% 0.20% 1.82 3.11% 3.34% 1.07 
Cantabria (1) 0.20% 0.19% 1.04 1.39% 1.33% 0.95 
Navarra (1) 0.15% 0.22% 0.69 1.41% 1.76% 1.25 
Murcia  (1) 0.15% 0.19% 0.80 2.51% 2.97% 0.85 
Extremadura (1) 0.01% 0.03% 0.54 2.79% 1.84% 0.66 
* In parenthesis, we indicate the number of airports of the region that provide commercial traffic. 
Source: Own elaboration on information obtained from the web page of the Ministerio de Fomento (Spanish ministry of transports), the 
Spanish statistics Institut (INE) and the web page of  IVIE-FBBVA.   
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Table 3. Investment equation estimates. N = 195 
1 Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.  
2 OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and contemporaneous 
correlation).  
3 Standard errors in parenthesis  
4 Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
5 Wald1 = Wald Test (2) of joint significance; BP = Breusch-Pagan LM test of cross-sectional correlation;  
Wald2 = Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity; Dp= Bhargava et al. test for serial autocorrelation 
(modified Durbin-Watson test)                                       
Table 4. Estimated elasticities (evaluated at sample means) 
Dependent variable: INV
FGLS (1) FGLS1 (2) PCSE2 (3) 
GDP  
 
PAX
NAC 
0.80 (0.32)** 
 
1.35 (0.16)*** 
 
1.31 (0.33)*** 
0.79 (0.01)*** 
 
1.34 (0.02)*** 
 
1.29 (0.03)*** 
0.80 (0.19)** 
 
1.35 (0.09)*** 
 
1.31 (0.20)*** 
1 Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.  
2 OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation).  
3 Standard errors in parenthesis  
4 Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
 
Dependent variable: INV
FGLS (1) FGLS1 (2) PCSE2 (3) 
GDP   
 
PAX
NAC 
 
Intercept 
3.96e-06 (1.56e-06)** 
 
1.349 (0.10)*** 
 
0.130 (0.03)*** 
 
-0.163 (0.03)*** 
3.93e-06 (4.03e-08)*** 
 
1.342 (0.01)*** 
 
0.128 (0.002)*** 
 
-0.161 (0.003)*** 
3.96e-06 (8.58e-07)*** 
 
1.349 (0.06)*** 
 
0.130 (0.01)*** 
 
-0.163 (0.02)*** 
Wald1  
R2
BP 
Wald2 
Dp
257.77*** 
-
453.986*** 
1.15e+05*** 
1.18 
69,350.32*** 
-
-
-
-
1,373.81*** 
0.57 
-
-
-
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Table 5. Investment equation estimates. N = 195 
1 OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation). 
2 Standard errors in parenthesis  
3 Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
 
Table 6. Estimated elasticities (evaluated at sample means) 
Dependent variable: INV
PCSE1 (1) PCSE1 (2) PCSE1 (3) 
GDP  
 
PAX
NAC 
 
INCUM 
 
SWING 
 
CORRE 
0.74 (0.21)*** 
 
1.40 (0.13)*** 
 
1.44 (0.23)*** 
 
0.82 (0.34)** 
 
-
-
0.77 (0.18)*** 
 
1.36 (0.10)*** 
 
1.33 (0.20)*** 
 
-
0.02 (0.05) 
 
-
0.74 (0.15)*** 
 
1.44 (0.12)*** 
 
1.51 (0.19)*** 
 
-
-
0.46 (0.13)*** 
1 OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation). 
2 Standard errors in parenthesis  
3 Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
 
Dependent variable: INV
PCSE1 (1) PCSE1 (2) PCSE1 (3) 
GDP   
 
PAX
NAC 
 
INCUM 
 
SWING 
 
CORRE 
 
Intercept 
3.65e-06 (9.44e-07)*** 
 
1.40 (0.08)*** 
 
0.14 (0.01)*** 
 
0.13 (0.05)** 
 
-
-
-0.22 (0.04)*** 
3.81e-06 (8.37e-07)*** 
 
1.36 (0.07)*** 
 
0.13 (0.02)*** 
 
-
0.0002 (0.0004) 
 
-
-0.16 (0.02)*** 
3.66e-06 (7.54e-07)** 
 
1.44 (0.08)*** 
 
0.15 (0.01)*** 
 
-
-
0.06 (0.01)*** 
 
-0.21 (0.03)*** 
Wald 
R2
1,231.96*** 
0.58 
1,291.71*** 
0.57 
1,373.81*** 
0.62 
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Table A-1. Description of the variables and summary statistics (Number of 
observations: 195) 
Variable Description Mean Standard 
deviation
Minimum 
value 
Maximum 
value 
INV 
 
INV
GDP 
 
PAX 
 
PAX
NAC 
 
INCUM 
 
SWING 
 
CORRE 
 
Total investment in airports of the region 
(103 euros) 
The share of investment of each region over 
total investment 
Gross Domestic Product per capita in each 
region (euros) 
Total output (number of annual passengers 
carried in airports of the region) 
The share of output of each region over 
total traffic 
Percentage of national passengers over total 
traffic in airports of each region 
Percentage of votes in the general elections 
for the incumbent party in each region 
 
The difference in the percentage of votes 
between the two main parties in the general 
elections across regions 
 
Correspondence between  incumbent party 
in the central and regional government in 
each region 
54,181.31
0.07 
 
13,368 
 
8,001,865
0.07 
 
0.66 
 
0.41 
 
0.08 
 
0.52 
 
184,457.3 
 
0.130 
 
4,054 
 
1.05e+07 
 
0.08 
 
0.27 
 
0.10 
 
0.12 
 
0.50 
 
10.22 
 
0
6,408 
 
15,547 
 
0
0.08 
 
0.18 
 
-0.21 
 
0
1,552,165 
 
0.707 
 
23,889 
 
3.81e+07 
 
0.26 
 
1
0.58 
 
0.32 
 
1
Table A-2. Spanish airports operating profits. Millions of euros 
Region Operating 
results 
(Yearly average 
1997-98) 
Share of the total 
surplus generated 
by regions with 
surplus  
Share of the 
net surplus 
of the 
network 
Ratio 
Investment-
traffic 
Madrid (1) 89.7 39.3% 45.7% 2.60 
Canary Islands (8) 
 
40.7 
 
17.8% 
 
20.8% 
 
0.41 
Catalonia (3) 40.2 17.6% 20.5% 0.99 
Balears Islands (3) 41.8 18.3% 21.3% 0.35 
Valencian C. (2) 10.8 4.7% 5.5% 0.35 
Andalusia (6) 5.1 2.2% 2.6% 0.39 
Surplus in system  228.3 100.0%   
Extremadura (1) -0.6  -0.3% 0.54 
Castile & Leon (3) -1.8  -0.9% 1.82 
Murcia (1) -2.0  -1.0% 0.80 
Navarra (1) -2.1  -1,1% 0.69 
Asturias (1) -2.6  -1.3% 0.98 
Cantabria (1) -2.8  -1.4% 1.04 
Aragon (1) -2.9  -1.5% 1.82 
Galicia (3) -6.9  -3.5% 0.70 
Basque C.(3) -7.6  -3.9% 1.18 
Losses in system -32.2  
Network surplus 196.1  100.0%  
Note 1: 1998 is the last year for which financial data on operating results for individual airports has been 
made available by AENA. See footnote 11 above. 
Note 2: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of commercial airports in each region. 
Source: Own elaboration on AENA information (published in Bel, 2002 and RvyT, 1999). 
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